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Abstract 
Social impact bonds (SIBs) have emerged as an alternative mechanism for financing projects 
with an explicit social purpose. This article contrasts the proposed benefits of SIBs with the 
more mixed performance of initial projects, and reviews the early literature, revealing a similar 
divide between initial optimism and subsequent critique. Despite this, SIBs continue to receive 
high-level support, whilst expanding their reach through controversial new ‘development’ and 
‘environmental’ impact bonds. This situation deserves more scrutiny in the accounting 
literature.   
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Reductions in public spending since the 2008 financial crisis have intensified demands to better 
allocate public resources. This challenging fiscal climate has led to an increasing policy focus 
on the potential benefits arising from the outsourcing of welfare and other social services.  One 
area of particular interest is the greater involvement of third sector organisations, especially 
where they already work alongside the public sector in service delivery settings. The move has 
been accompanied by the outsourcing of funding for services, this time through the 
involvement of the private sector. To provide sufficient incentives to attract private capital and 
ensure successful outcomes in the service being delivered, Social Impact Bonds (SIBs 
hereafter) have emerged as an alternative mechanism for financing welfare projects and 
enterprises that have an explicit social purpose. Two additional variants of this approach, 
Development Impact Bonds and Environmental Impact Bonds, have also been introduced more 
recently, and are considered later in this article.  
 
While referred to as a bond, the use of such a term is misleading: instead, SIBs are better 
understood as a type of performance or outcomes-based contract, involving a public-private 
partnership. Rather than funding and delivering services directly, government agencies use a 
commissioner to broker an arrangement between private investors and third sector service 
providers. Investors provide upfront funding for a project, with the initial investment plus a 
further return being repaid to them if a set of pre-defined outcome targets are met by the service 
provider. This basic arrangement is attractive for the government agency, not least because the 
investor (rather than the government) is expected to provide the upfront investment and bear 
the outcomes risk. In addition, the focus on measurable outcomes (rather than outputs) may 
improve accountability of service provision, by setting clearer expectations of what is to be 
achieved. A further feature of SIBs is an emphasis on preventative forms of intervention, such 
as reducing recidivism, homelessness or youth unemployment. If successful, such interventions 
are expected to generate additional cost savings by avoiding the remedial spending incurred, 
including costs of policing, prisons, the justice system and state benefits. A share of these 
potential cost savings is then set aside as the additional return given to investors, but only if 
the agreed outcome targets are met. Otherwise, investors can stand to lose out.  
 
Since the first SIB was launched in 2010 at Peterborough prison in the UK (Disley et al., 2011), 
the number of projects had grown to 32 in the UK, and 60 internationally by the beginning of 
2017 (Social Finance, 2016). Whilst this level of growth is substantial, the overall value of the 
SIB field is still comparatively small, with the investment element of each SIB (in the UK) 
typically less than £2 million (Big Society Capital, 2016). As the number of projects has grown, 
the results of early SIBs have begun to emerge. However, the picture appears to be rather 
mixed. For example, the pioneering project at Peterborough prison, which was intended to 
reduce recidivism amongst prisoners, appears to have worked well initially, but was much less 
effective in its later stages, leading to the early closure of the scheme (Disley et al. 2011; 
Ogman, 2016), while a similar project at Rikers Island Prison in New York (the first of its kind 
in the US) was widely regarded as an outright failure (Rudd et al. 2013). 
 
Despite these mixed results, successive UK governments have continued to back the idea 
enthusiastically, providing significant financial resources, policy measures and institutional 
arrangements to further encourage and facilitate its adoption (Cabinet Office, 2016; Big 
Society Capital, 2016; Social Finance, 2016). The ongoing high-level endorsement of SIB as a 
funding mechanism has in turn encouraged the establishment of a variety of think-tanks, 
consultancies and others involved in promoting and operating SIBs. The ‘grey literature’ 
produced by these organisations, in the form of commentaries, reports, toolkits and so on is 
extensive. A recent comprehensive review of the extant SIB literature (Fraser et al., 2018) 
found it comfortably exceeds the volume of published academic research on SIBs to date. More 
importantly, it also suggested that the grey literature on SIBs is largely devoted to presenting a 
variety of reformist narratives aimed at the key parties involved in the contractual process. 
Firstly, a ‘public sector reform’ narrative targets government agencies and the third sector, and 
typically advocates the use of private sector management methods to drive greater innovation 
and alleviate what are presented as inherent flaws in non-profit styles of service delivery and 
accountability. At the same time, however, a ‘private sector reform’ narrative is also deployed 
to an investor audience, in which potential providers of capital are encouraged to consider SIBs 
as a commercial opportunity which can also grow private sector involvement with the public 
sector and pursue (and allow investors to obtain legitimacy from) socially responsible business 
practices. As Balboa (2016) argues, these narratives together present a seemingly perfect 
scenario of a ‘win-win-win’ for investors, government agencies and the public. However, is 
this carefully constructed, utopian solution simply too good to be true? 
 
Perhaps given the intrinsic complexity of SIB contracts, efforts to develop and improve them 
from a practitioner-focused perspective have been generally well-received (Fraser et al., 2018). 
These efforts involve further consideration of the practical issues around outcomes 
measurement and reporting as well as the difficulties arising from the long contractual 
timescales of SIBs (see, for example, CIPFA, 2012). However, the largely positive and 
constructive tone of the grey literature may be contrasted with a more cautious and critical 
narrative emerging from recent academic studies on SIBs (Fraser et al., 2018). Even where this 
literature shares a concern to develop more robust outcomes measures and contract designs, 
academic studies have stressed the underlying complexities of social problems, and argued that 
they cannot be reduced to simplistic cause-and-effect modelling (McHugh et al, 2013). Beyond 
this, the academic literature has extended its theoretical analysis to develop a more wide-
ranging and profound critique of the impact of financial sector interests on the structure, 
regulation and underlying agenda of SIBs and on the delivery of the public services involved 
(Clifford and Jung, 2016). Rather than the seductive ‘win-win-win’ narrative emanating from 
institutional actors and networks directly involved in the development and delivery of SIBs, 
academic studies tend to frame the emergence of the funding mechanism as “represent(ing) the 
worst of both [private financial and social services] sectors” (Fraser et al., 2018, p. 5). 
 
A number of specific themes and issues may be identified from a review of these studies. For 
some, including Warner (2013), McHugh et al. (2013) and Balboa (2016), the structure of 
impact bonds dilutes and compromises accountability relationships between governments and 
services, by outsourcing the services themselves and the process of service commissioning. 
These studies also argue that impact bonds can negatively affect accountability relationships 
between service providers and local communities, by pressuring the third sector to grow and 
amalgamate to achieve ‘investment-readiness’ and obtain sufficient working capital to deliver 
large projects. The weakening of accountability is also associated with questions about 
governance within the SIBs, in terms of potential shortcomings in government oversight and 
control over service delivery (McHugh et al., 2013), and a lower quality of provision compared 
to a publicly-provided service (Mullins et al., 2011). At the same time, as Balboa (2016, p.40) 
argues, SIBs also introduce a form of accountability bias that favours “financial outcomes, 
prioritising financial accountability for future projects before they are even created”.  
 
The bias towards financial accountability is related to a deeper concern expressed within 
academic studies, surrounding the way in which private sector norms and practices are being 
promoted as a solution to social problems and introduced into the third sector. For some, this 
is symptomatic of an underlying ideological shift within government towards the neo-liberal 
restructuring of public services (McHugh et al., 2013; Lake, 2015; Ogman, 2016; Dowling, 
2017; Rosamond, 2016; Cooper et al., 2016). In this context, SIBs are viewed as another 
manifestation of what has been termed the ‘financialisation’ of valuation in public policy 
(Chiapello, 2015), whereby social and welfare objectives are subordinated to financial sector 
interests. As Dowling (2017, p.306) argues, “financialisation is not a simple process of 
allocating resources […]; it imposes a set of disciplinary measures that shape the social 
processes they affect, in turn privatising gains and socialising risks and costs”. Insights from 
major case studies into the negative consequences of SIB projects as solutions to social 
problems are also now beginning to emerge. For example, Cooper et al. (2016) critically 
examine the use of SIBs to deliver homelessness services in London, and argue that: 
 
the SIB is thoroughly neoliberal in that it is constructed upon an assumption that there 
is no such thing as a social problem, only individuals who fail. The SIB transforms all 
participants in the bond, except perhaps the homeless themselves, into entrepreneurs. 
The homeless are instead “failed entrepreneurs” who become securitized into the 
potential future cash flows of investors. (p.63) 
 
While the focus of the grey and academic literature has been on the development and 
implementation of SIBs to deliver social and welfare services in developed economies, it is 
also important to briefly highlight the emergence of two further versions of impact bonds, 
which essentially apply the same model but within quite different settings. Development 
Impact Bonds (DIBs) (Development Impact Bond Working Group, 2013) follow the same 
basic approach of seeking private investment for social programmes, but in this case, 
investment is directed into developing countries, with private investors are typically 
remunerated by donors rather than host-country governments, who may lack the necessary 
resources to fund services. In seeking to improve the quality and efficiency of public services 
in developing countries, DIBs are increasingly being viewed as a potential way of mobilising 
the huge investment required to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (Aldiss, 2016). 
However, the role of wealthy ‘philanthrocapitalist’ donors in acting on behalf of host 
governments in developing countries is controversial. Indeed, according to Kish and Leroy 
(2015) it represents a further unwelcome expansion of the territorial boundaries and limits of 
financialisation, containing implicit overtones of racial oppression and slavery. 
 
The emergence of Environmental Impact Bonds (EIBs) is another recent development as a 
means of financing environmentally sustainable initiatives. EIBs operate along similar lines as 
SIBs and DIBs, but it is important to emphasise that this also means they are quite different to 
the larger and more established market in green and climate bonds. These are financial 
instruments which have been issued by large financial institutions and corporations and which 
generally function much like conventional debt-securities (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2016). By 
contrast, EIB development is at a much more nascent stage, with the first proposals emerging 
in 2013 (Clark and Nicola, 2013; Nicola, 2013) and initial experimentation currently limited 
to two US-based projects, in urban stormwater management (Gonella, 2017) and forestry 
conservation and resilience (Yonavjak, 2016; Blue Forest Conservation, 2016). One of the 
suggested advantages of EIBs over other varieties of impact bond is the potential for 
measurable and quantifiable characteristics of the desired outcomes. Whereas SIB metrics are 
often developed from scratch, many standardised metrics already exist that may be directly 
applicable within EIBs (Clark and Nicola, 2013). While there appears to be some enthusiasm 
for the potential of EIBs to solve environmental problems, many of the underlying 
accountability and governance problems associated with the involvement of private capital 
remain (Balboa, 2016). More broadly, the important role of both green/climate bonds (as well 
as EIBs and other forms of ecosystem payments mechanisms) in driving the expansion of 
private investment in what is becoming known as ‘natural capital’ remains highly 
controversial, leading to a further expansion of the process of financialisation into nature itself 
(Sullivan, 2014). 
 
To conclude, while enthusiasm for impact bonds as a financing mechanism to solve social and 
environmental problems continues unabated amongst governments and their networks of 
supporting organisations, wider opinion on the merits of impact bonds is far more divided. The 
academic literature has been slower to catch up and respond to the issues at stake, but this is 
now changing, although it should also be noted that most studies continue to be published 
outside, rather than within, the accounting literature. The scope and depth of the critique 
emerging from this literature suggests that the claims being made about the potential role of 
impact bonds in addressing fundamental societal, developmental and environmental problems 
are often exaggerated. While there may be circumstances in which specific interventions can 
deliver benefits to both public and private sectors, the expansion of impact bonds into areas of 
social dislocation and poverty, especially in the developing world, as well as into the natural 
environment, is clearly controversial and deserves much greater scrutiny. Further critical 
examination, including within case study settings (see, for example, Cooper et al., 2016) is 
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